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I. Introduction
The failure to appoint counsel in misdemeanor cases may
represent one of the most widespread violations of federal
constitutional rights in criminal cases. A decade ago, in Alabama
v. Shelton,1 the Supreme Court held that indigent defendants
sentenced to suspended terms of incarceration in misdemeanor
cases2 have a constitutional right to appointed counsel, even if
∗ Associate Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. I appreciate
all of the work done both by my research assistant, Matthew Onyett (’13), and
by the Symposium organizers and editors. Thanks also are due to Dan Coenen
for his editing. All errors, of course, are my own.
1. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
2. The term “misdemeanor cases” in this Article encompasses all
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the defendant is never actually incarcerated.3 At the time, many
jurisdictions limited the misdemeanor right to counsel to
defendants either actually sentenced to imprisonment or likely to
receive imprisonment sentences. Shelton therefore required those
jurisdictions to appoint counsel in significantly more cases than
before.4 The Court’s ruling notwithstanding, there is substantial
evidence—both anecdotal and statistical—suggesting that some
jurisdictions routinely fail to provide legal representation to those
constitutionally entitled to it.
Several factors contribute to this omission. First, some
jurisdictions have simply refused to honor the Court’s holding.
Second, potentially unconstitutional barriers to the appointment
of counsel—including prohibitively high fees imposed on
defendants, failures to fully inform defendants of their right to
counsel, and promises of prompt case resolution only in the
absence of counsel—may lead some defendants to waive counsel.
Of particular concern, in comparison with felony defendants
threatened with long prison terms, Shelton defendants may be
less likely to research the scope of their rights and learn that they
have a right to counsel if their terms of imprisonment are
suspended. Third, an absence of incentives for defense counsel to
intervene may stand in the way of providing representation to
those who are constitutionally entitled to it. Most constitutional
rights to which defendants are entitled are enforced by lawyers
advocating on their behalf. If no lawyer is appointed, however,
there is no advocate to assure that the defendant’s rights—
including the right to counsel—are respected. As a systemic
matter, moreover, public defenders or other court-appointed
counsel may be so overburdened that they have neither the time

nonfelony criminal cases, including both misdemeanors and petty offenses.
3. Shelton, 535 U.S. at 672. The Court left open the possibility that a
suspended sentence of imprisonment might not give rise to a right to counsel if
the state permitted the defendant to relitigate guilt at any probation revocation
hearing.
4. Twelve states required the appointment of counsel only if the defendant
was actually imprisoned. See Brief of the States of Texas, et al. as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (No. 00-1214), 2001 WL
826715 at *23 n.10 (listing the twelve states as Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado,
Florida, Georgia, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, and Texas).
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to litigate the denial of counsel issue nor the resources to handle
the additional cases that would come their way if they won.
This Article argues that all of these forces, especially in their
joint operation, have created a profound problem. The central
difficulty is that major constitutional violations occur on a regular
basis—to the detriment of highly vulnerable criminal defendants
and our legal system as a whole. Some might argue that the
Court in Shelton did not draw the optimal line for the right to
counsel. But that line has been drawn, and the Shelton rule offers
benefits that are well worth defending. Given a commitment to
the Shelton line, this Article explores ways to guard the rights it
guarantees. Ultimately, we need to gather more data to ascertain
the extent of noncompliance with the misdemeanor right to
counsel and to publicize infringements—especially systemic
infringements—of those rights. To the extent that there are
widespread violations of Shelton that have not been litigated,
private members of the Bar must assure that they become the
subject of lawsuits in order to vindicate the constitutional right to
counsel.
II. The Constitutional Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases:
The Law and the Reality
A. The Constitutional Requirement
The story of the constitutional right to counsel neither begins
nor ends with Gideon v. Wainwright.5 Rather, the Court planted
the seed for Gideon when it concluded that the Constitution
requires counsel in death penalty cases prosecuted in state courts
at least under certain circumstances.6 Six years later, the Court
extended that right to noncapital felony defendants charged in
federal court.7 For a quarter-century, however, the Court did not
expand the right to counsel. Then, in Gideon, the Court issued a
5. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 58 (1932) (holding that defendants
should have been afforded “right of assistance of counsel” in prosecution for
rape).
7. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 469 (1938) (holding that petitioner
was entitled to the right of assistance of counsel in a case in which petitioner
was charged with the felony of possessing and uttering counterfeit money).
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historic pronouncement, extending the right to appointed counsel
to all felony defendants prosecuted in state courts and extolling
the importance of that right in no uncertain terms.8
In the wake of Gideon, however, the constitutional right to
counsel for misdemeanor defendants remained murky. In 1972
the Court held in Argersinger v. Hamlin9 that all defendants
charged with misdemeanor offenses had a constitutional right to
counsel, as long as they were sentenced to any term of
incarceration.10 Argersinger, however, left open the question of
right to counsel with sentences that could, but do not
immediately, result in incarceration. In Shelton, the Court
addressed that critical question, holding that defendants
sentenced to suspended terms of imprisonment have a right to
counsel, unless either (1) the state offers an opportunity to
relitigate guilt or innocence at any later revocation proceeding or
(2) the defendant is sentenced to probation that cannot trigger
incarceration.11 The practical effect of Shelton is that all
misdemeanor defendants sentenced either to probation or
incarceration have a right to the appointment of counsel. All
other misdemeanor or petty offense defendants, including those
who could have been sentenced to incarceration but instead
received only a fine, do not have a federal constitutional right to
representation.12
8. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342–43.
9. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
10. See id. at 26 (holding that a defendant sentenced to incarceration had
right to counsel regardless of whether the offense was classified as a petty
offense or a misdemeanor).
11. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 655–57 (2002) (holding that “a
suspended sentence that may ‘end up in the actual deprivation of a person’s
liberty’ may not be imposed unless the defendant was accorded ‘the guiding
hand of counsel’ in the prosecution for the crime charged” but discussing two
exceptions to this rule (quoting Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40)).
12. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979) (holding that a
defendant sentenced to a fine had no right to counsel even though crime was
punishable by imprisonment). Of course, some states provide a more expansive
right to counsel than the federal constitution. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 802-1
(1993) (providing a right to counsel to any indigent person charged with an
offense punishable by imprisonment); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/113-3 (2000)
(providing right to counsel in all criminal cases except those punishable only by
a fine); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3902 (1990) (providing right to counsel for all
indigent defendants charged with misdemeanors punishable by imprisonment).
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B. The Constitutional Right in Practice
Although many misdemeanor defendants have a right to
counsel under Argersinger and Shelton, the enforcement of that
right has not been respected in the same way it has been for
felony defendants. Counsel is routinely appointed for virtually all
felony defendants who cannot afford a lawyer.13 The available
evidence indicates, however, that representation rates for
misdemeanor defendants, who have a constitutional right to
counsel, lag behind those for felony defendants and lag far behind
in at least some jurisdictions.14 This evidence includes (1) the
admission of one state supreme court chief justice that her state
does not comply with Shelton; (2) a survey of inmates
incarcerated for misdemeanor convictions; and (3) data on
misdemeanor caseloads of public defenders in a couple of states.
First, noncompliance with Shelton has been openly admitted
in one state. The Chief Justice of the South Carolina Supreme
Court has been quoted as saying that Shelton is “one of the more
misguided decisions of the United States Supreme Court . . . If we
adhered to it in South Carolina we would have the right to
counsel probably . . . by dragooning lawyers out of their law
offices to take these cases in every magistrate’s court in South
Carolina, and I have simply told my magistrates that we just
don’t have the resources to do that. So I will tell you straight up
we [are] not adhering to Alabama v. Shelton in every situation.”15
It is possible that South Carolina stands alone in its failure to
13. See CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: DEFENSE COUNSEL IN
CRIMINAL CASES 5 (2000), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf

(noting that 99.6% of felony defendants in the nation’s 75 largest counties were
represented by counsel in 1996). The effectiveness of the representation being
provided certainly has been debated, see, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the
Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103
YALE L. J. 1835, 1841–44 (1994), but at the very least, virtually all felony
defendants have a lawyer.
14. See, e.g., HARLOW, supra note 13, at 1, 3 (reporting that although 99.7%
of felony defendants in federal court were represented, 38.4% of misdemeanor
defendants were unrepresented).
15. Bobby G. Frederick, The Scarlett Letter, TRIAL THEORY: A S.C. CRIMINAL
DEFENSE BLOG, (Oct. 10, 2009, 2:20 PM), http://www.trialtheory.com/
legislation/the_scarlet_letter/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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comply with Shelton, but particularly given the data set forth
below, that seems unlikely.
Second, although there are no nationwide data documenting
the extent to which constitutionally entitled misdemeanants in
state courts have counsel, the one national dataset documenting
representation—at least for misdemeanor defendants sentenced
to incarceration—indicates that many constitutionally-entitled
misdemeanor defendants remain unrepresented. The only
available nationwide data on representation rates in
misdemeanor cases come from a Bureau of Justice Statistics
(BJS) survey of inmates confined in local jails.16 Data from those
surveys demonstrate that a significant percentage of
misdemeanor defendants who have a right to counsel are not
represented. All of the inmates included in Table 1 were
incarcerated as a result of their misdemeanor convictions and
therefore had a right to counsel.17 But in 2002, 30% of them
reported that they were not represented.
Table 1: Representation for Inmates Charged with Misdemeanors
and Sentenced to Incarceration18
Represented by counsel
Not represented by counsel
Do not know

Percentage19
69.4
30.0
0.5

These numbers confirm that a significant percentage of
misdemeanor defendants who had a right to counsel under
Argersinger remained unrepresented in federal court. The
dataset, however, has relatively limited value for drawing broad
conclusions about misdemeanor representations. Most important,
the sample of misdemeanor defendants surveyed was small, so it
16. INTER-UNIV. CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL & SOC. RESEARCH, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, SURVEY OF INMATES IN LOCAL JAILS (2002), available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR04359.v2 (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) [hereinafter
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SURVEY OF INMATES] (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
17. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (holding that no
person can be imprisoned without representation or valid waiver of the right to
counsel).
18. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SURVEY OF INMATES, supra note 16.
19. Percentages do not add up to 100% because of rounding.
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is difficult to draw definitive conclusions from the data.20 In
addition, the survey includes only defendants incarcerated as a
result of their convictions (the so-called Argersinger defendants),
and thus, provides no information on Shelton defendants who
received probated sentences. As a result, these statistics may
underreport the lack of representation because Shelton
defendants would seem to be at a higher risk for unconstitutional
denial of the right to counsel than Argersinger defendants.21
Unfortunately, we have no data to assess, on a nationwide basis,
whether Shelton defendants are receiving counsel. Indeed, we do
not even have any idea how many Shelton and Argersinger
defendants there are because there is no nationwide database
with information on misdemeanor cases.
The lack of nationwide data stems both from the BJS’s
failure to collect data on misdemeanor defendants and from the
difficulty of ascertaining which misdemeanor defendants are
entitled to representation. Although the BJS maintains data
(including representation rates) on felony defendants prosecuted
in state courts in the seventy-five largest counties in the
country,22 it does not collect similar data on misdemeanor
defendants. Thus, there is no nationwide database on
misdemeanor defendants in state courts. Indeed, other than the
information gathered in the survey of jail inmates described
above, we know very little about misdemeanor cases in the states
except as to those few states that make such data publicly
available. In addition, unlike in felony cases, the right to counsel
in misdemeanor cases depends upon the sentence the defendant
ultimately receives,23 so even if data on misdemeanor
20. There were only 559 inmates who were convicted of misdemeanors and
sentenced to imprisonment for that conviction who responded to the question
regarding representation. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SURVEY OF INMATES,
supra note 16.
21. See ALISA SMITH & SEAN MADDEN, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF.
LAWYERS, THREE-MINUTE JUSTICE: HASTE AND WASTE IN FLORIDA’S MISDEMEANOR
COURTS 15 (2011), http://www.nacdl.org/News.aspx?id=23653&terms=three+
minute+justice (noting that the “most significant predictor of waiving counsel at
arraignment was the custody status of the defendant. In custody defendants
were 10 times more likely than released defendants to obtain counsel”).
22. HARLOW, supra note 13, at 4. Indeed, the Bureau of Justice Statistics
documents not only whether defendants were represented, but also by what type
of counsel.
23. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 36 (holding that without representation or
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representation rates were available, that data would not
necessarily reflect the extent to which defendants constitutionally
entitled to counsel remain unrepresented.24 In the absence of
more complete data, the survey of inmates in local jails provides
the only nationwide information on representation in
misdemeanor cases, and it at the very least strongly suggests
that many misdemeanor defendants who have a constitutional
right to counsel remain unrepresented.
The final piece of evidence draws on information from both
North Carolina and Florida that supports rough estimates of
misdemeanor representation practices in those jurisdictions.
These data suggest both that there may be a fair amount of
interjurisdiction variation in the provision of counsel in
misdemeanor cases and that at least some states may not be
providing counsel to constitutionally entitled misdemeanants at
rates comparable to those of felony defendants. In North
Carolina, the one state with readily available misdemeanor
sentencing statistics,25 it appears that the misdemeanor and
felony caseloads of publicly appointed counsel roughly

valid waiver a defendant may not be imprisoned); see also Scott v. Illinois, 440
U.S. 367, 369 (1979) (clarifying Argersinger by explaining that the Constitution
does not require a defendant to have representation if “imprisonment upon
conviction is authorized but not actually imposed”); Erica J. Hashimoto, The
Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 461, 476–80
(2007).
24. In addition, of course, as with felony defendants, misdemeanor
defendants only have a right to state-appointed counsel if they are indigent and
cannot afford a lawyer. See Adam Gershowitz, The Invisible Pillar of Gideon, 80
IND. L. REV. 571, 571–72 (2005) (noting that the Supreme Court has expanded
an indigent’s right to counsel to misdemeanor cases but discussing how
precedent leaves unclear how poor a person must be to qualify for appointed
counsel). Thus, data on rates of indigence also would be needed to determine the
extent to which those constitutionally entitled to counsel are not being
represented.
25. North Carolina has a structured sentencing system for misdemeanors,
and keeps statistics on sentences imposed in most misdemeanor cases. See T.
FLINCHUM, A. GALLAGHER, G. HEVENER & V. ETHERIDGE, N.C. SENTENCING AND
POL’Y ADVISORY COMM’N, STRUCTURED SENTENCING STATISTICAL REPORT FOR
FELONIES AND MISDEMEANORS: FISCAL YEAR 2008/09, at 44–53 (2010),
http://www.nccourts.org/courts/crs/councils/spac/documents/statisticalrpt_fy0809
r.pdf. The report excludes sentences for misdemeanor driving under the
influence cases because they are not covered by the structured sentencing
system. Id. at 37.
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approximate the expected caseloads. But the caseloads of Florida
public defenders do not reflect expected trends.
In North Carolina, approximately 80% of misdemeanor
defendants received sentences that give rise to a constitutional
right to counsel. As set forth in Table 2 below, in fiscal year 2008–
2009, the vast majority of misdemeanor defendants were
sentenced to either incarceration or probation.

Community
Punishment:
Supervised
Probation

Community
Punishment:
Unsupervised
Probation

Community
Punishment:
Fine only

Community
Punishment:
Unspecified or
Unreported28

24%

Intermediate
Punishment27

Incarceration

Table 2: Misdemeanor Sentences in North Carolina26

2%

24%

31%

7%

13%

Although not all of those defendants had court-appointed
counsel, caseloads of court-appointed lawyers suggest that a
significant percentage of them were represented. Data from two
separate sources indicate that court-appointed counsel in North
Carolina represent between 1.4 and 1.7 misdemeanor defendants
for every felony defendant. In 2007, the BJS collected caseload
information from indigent defense systems across the country.29
The public defender offices in North Carolina that handle
misdemeanor cases had a total of 21,185 felony noncapital cases,
and 28,760 misdemeanor cases.30 In other words, those offices
26. Id. at 44–53.
27. Intermediate punishments include sanctions such as “Special Probation
(SP), House Arrest with Electronic Monitoring (HAEM), Intensive Supervision
Probation (ISP), Day Reporting Center (DRC), Residential Treatment Facility
(RESID), and Drug Treatment Court (DTC).” Id. at 49.
28. The type of community punishment was not reported for approximately
8% of the cases in which the court imposed a community punishment. Id. at 51.
In addition, in 9% of the cases in which the court ordered community
punishment, no specific sanction was ordered. I have combined those two
categories for purposes of this table.
29. The 2007 census sent questionnaires to 1046 public defender offices and
received responses from approximately 97% of the offices. See INTER-UNIV.
CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL & SOC. RESEARCH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
CENSUS OF PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES: COUNTY-BASED AND LOCAL OFFICES
(ICPSR 29502) 5 (2007), http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/studies
/29502/documentation [hereinafter CENSUS OF PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES].
30. Id.
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took in approximately 1.4 misdemeanor cases for every felony
case.31 Similarly, data available from the court system reflects
that in fiscal year 2011–2012, public defenders and courtappointed counsel disposed of approximately 122,705 nontraffic
misdemeanor cases and 73,808 felony cases, or approximately 1.7
misdemeanor cases for every felony.32
Like most jurisdictions, North Carolina prosecutes more
misdemeanor than felony cases. In fiscal year 2010–2011, for
instance, approximately 102,803 felony cases were filed in
superior court33 and 74,887 in district court34 for a total of
177,680 felony cases. In the same time frame, 487,252 nontraffic
misdemeanor cases were filed.35 Factoring in that only about 80%
of North Carolina’s misdemeanor defendants received sentences
requiring the appointment of counsel, the misdemeanor to felony
ratio should be approximately 2.2 misdemeanor cases for every
felony (assuming equivalent rates of indigence between
misdemeanor and felony defendants), rather than 1.4 or 1.7
31. Id.
32. N.C. COURT SYS., Public Defender Case Disposition Activity Report:
Fiscal Year 2011–2012 (2012), available at http://www.nccourts.org/
Citizens/SRPlanning/Statistics/CAReports_fy11-12.asp (follow “Public Defender
Case Disposition Activity Report” hyperlink). Superior Courts in North Carolina
have jurisdiction over felony cases and hear appeals from misdemeanor cases.
District Courts have jurisdiction over certain felony dispositions and also
process most of the misdemeanor cases. The numbers listed above include all
misdemeanors in either district court (115,812) or superior court (6,893) that
reported either public defender or court-appointed representation, and all
felonies in superior court reporting those categories of representation (42,587)
along with any felonies in district court reporting both a final disposition (i.e., a
guilty plea, trial, or dismissal) and the same representation categories (31,221).
33. N.C. COURT SYS., NORTH CAROLINA COURTS STATISTICAL AND
OPERATIONAL REPORT: 2010–2011 TRIAL COURTS 3 (2011), http://www.nccourts.
org/Citizens/SRPlanning/Documents/2010-11_SOR-TrialCourts.pdf.
34. As with the representation statistics set forth above, I included only
those district court felony cases that were resolved in district court.
35. See N.C. COURT SYS., supra note 33, at 3, 6 (reporting 465,189 nontraffic
misdemeanor cases were filed in district court and 22,063 were filed in superior
court). A total of 1.12 million traffic offenses (including DUI’s) were filed, but
not included in these numbers. See id. (reporting 1,117,325 were filed in district
court and 10,758 were filed in superior court). In fiscal year 2010–2011, 67,712
impaired driving cases were filed in North Carolina. N.C. JUDICIAL DEP’T,
ANALYSIS OF FY2010-2011 IMPAIRED DRIVING CHARGES AND IMPLIED CONSENT
CHARGES FILED AND CHARGES DISPOSED 1 (2011), http://www.nccourts.
org/Citizens/SRPlanning/Documents/ratfy2010-2011.pdf.
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misdemeanors per felony. That difference may be attributable, at
least in part, to differing rates of indigence between misdemeanor
and felony defendants, but we currently do not have sufficient data to
reach that conclusion.36 It appears, then, that although North
Carolina’s misdemeanor representation rates are not as high as its
felony representation rates, they at least approach that rate.
The data regarding misdemeanor representation in Florida is
much more problematic, raising concerns that the patterns of
appointment of counsel have shifted away from appointments in
misdemeanor cases in the wake of Shelton. Prior to Shelton, Florida
did not require the appointment of counsel in misdemeanor cases if
the trial judge “filed a statement in writing that the defendant will
not be imprisoned if convicted.”37 Recognizing that Shelton
defendants could be deprived of counsel under this rule, the Florida
Supreme Court altered state practice to require representation in
misdemeanor cases unless the trial judge files a written order
“certifying that the defendant will not be incarcerated in the case
pending trial or probation violation hearing, or as part of a sentence
after trial, guilty or nolo contendere plea, or probation revocation.”38
Because Shelton required counsel for this whole new category of
defendants in Florida, it seems as though it should have resulted in
the appointment of counsel in significantly more misdemeanor cases.
That fact notwithstanding, data from BJS’s surveys of indigent
defense systems in 199939 and 200740 suggest that the proportion of
36. See HARLOW, supra note 13, at 1, 6 (reporting that in 1998, 82% of felony
defendants in state courts had court-appointed counsel, but only 56% of
misdemeanor defendants being held in local jails either as part of a sentence or pretrial had court-appointed counsel). It is difficult to draw any conclusions about the
rates of indigence of misdemeanor defendants from this statistic, however, both
because 28% of the local jail inmates reported having no lawyer so there is no data
on their indigence and because it is not at all clear that the rates of indigence of jail
inmates are representative of all misdemeanor defendants.
37. Amendments to FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.111(b)(1), 837 So. 2d 924, 927 (2002).
38. Id.
39. In 1999, the Bureau of Justice Statistics collected program data from 314
criminal defense programs in 72 of the 100 largest counties (the other 28 counties
were located in states that wholly funded indigent representation). See INTER-UNIV.
CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL & SOC. RESEARCH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL SURVEY OF INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS (ICPSR 3081)
3–5 (2001), http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/studies/3081/documenta
tion (follow “Codebook–pdf” hyperlink). The 1999 survey included data from seven
Florida counties.
40. The 2007 census sent questionnaires to 1046 public defender offices and

1030

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1019 (2013)

misdemeanor cases in relation to felony cases handled by those offices
decreased during that time period. In response to those surveys,
indigent defense providers from a number of counties furnished data
on the number of misdemeanor and felony cases they handled. The
2007 census includes data from more than twice as many Florida
offices as the 1999 survey, so the data presented in Table 3 for
purposes of comparison is calibrated to 1000 felony cases.
Table 3: Proportion of Felony and Misdemeanor Cases
Represented by Appointed Counsel in Florida
(Adjusted to 1000 Felonies)
1999 Survey41
2007 Census42

Number of Felony Cases
1000
1000

Number of Misdemeanors Cases
1723
1066

Thus, for every 1000 felony cases in 1999, indigent defense
systems in Florida represented defendants in 1723 misdemeanor
cases. But by 2007, that number had shrunk to 1066
misdemeanor cases per 1000 felony cases, a nearly 40% drop. The
reduction in misdemeanor cases is especially problematic given
that one would have expected the proportion of misdemeanor to
felony cases to rise after Shelton and the associated Florida rule
change, both of which occurred in 2002.
As with the data from North Carolina, there are several
potentially significant limitations to the usefulness of this data
for the purposes of drawing any definitive conclusions about the
extent of misdemeanor representation. First, data on the number
of misdemeanor and felony cases prosecuted in Florida are not
available either for 1999 or 2007, so it is possible that the
proportion of misdemeanor cases to felony cases decreased
significantly between 1999 and 2007. Second, at least some of the
data in the 1999 and 2007 surveys came from different offices,43
received responses from approximately 97% of the offices. See CENSUS OF PUBLIC
DEFENDER OFFICES, supra note 29, at 5. It included data from offices in fifteen
Florida counties.
41. The dataset on which I based this analysis is available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR03081.v1.
42. The dataset on which I based this analysis is available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR29502.v1.
43. It is somewhat difficult to ascertain the offices that responded to these
questions in the two surveys, but both datasets appear to include information
from Pinellas, Palm Beach, and Broward Counties. The remaining jurisdictions
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so it is possible that the offices completing the 2007 census do not
represent most of the misdemeanor defendants in their
jurisdictions.44 Finally, because misdemeanor sentencing
statistics are not available for Florida, the number of Shelton
defendants cannot be ascertained. There is, however, evidence
that roughly a quarter of misdemeanor defendants in Florida who
pled guilty at arraignment were sentenced to probation, so one
would have expected at least some increase, rather than a
decrease, in the misdemeanor statistics between 1999 and 2007.45
The limitations on the data notwithstanding, the
proportional drop in misdemeanor representation in Florida
raises grave concerns that a significant percentage of
misdemeanor defendants who are constitutionally entitled to
counsel remain unrepresented. And if a significant percentage of
these defendants are going unrepresented in Florida, it is likely
they are going unrepresented in at least some other states as
well. Indeed, all evidence points toward significant percentages of
constitutionally-entitled misdemeanor defendants who remain
unrepresented. The question, then, is why.
III. The Reasons Underlying the Numbers
The data are far from complete, but it appears that
representation rates of misdemeanor defendants who have a right
to counsel do not approach representation rates in felony cases. It
also appears that states may vary quite significantly in those
representation rates—a fact that suggests that constitutional
violations are occurring, and perhaps occurring in large numbers.
Why are misdemeanor defendants entitled to counsel not
likely are different.
44. The force of that argument is undermined by the fact that Florida law
requires public defender offices to represent all indigent defendants charged
either with felonies or with misdemeanors unless the trial judge has filed the
certification that the defendant is not entitled to representation. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 27.51 (West 2006). There also, of course, is an exception for conflict cases. Id.
§ 27.511.
45. See SMITH & MADDEN, supra note 21, at 18–19 tbl.6 (reporting that in
observations of 1649 arraignments in twenty-one of Florida’s sixty-seven
counties over an eight month period, 27% of those who pled guilty at
arraignment were sentenced to probation).
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represented to the same extent as felony defendants? Two sets of
answers deserve exploration. The first concerns real-world
barriers individual defendants face. The second involves systemic
forces that give rise to those real-world conditions.
A. Criminal Defendants and the Real World
Misdemeanor defendants confront real-world obstacles to
obtaining court-appointed counsel, including (1) the provision of
insufficient information to defendants; (2) prohibitively high fees
charged to misdemeanor defendants who exercise their right to
counsel; and (3) the interest that many defendants have in
obtaining a speedy resolution of their cases.46 Each of these
factors significantly limits appointment of counsel to
misdemeanor defendants.
There is evidence that, at least in some jurisdictions,
defendants waive the right to counsel without being adequately
informed of the existence and scope of that right.47 Cases such as
those in which waiver is based on insufficient information clearly
involve unconstitutional denials of counsel. Although voluntary
waivers of the right to counsel must be respected,48 the Court has
emphasized that the defendant must not only know of the
existence of the right but also understand the risks of waiving
such right before the defendant forfeits it.49
46. ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ, MALIA N. BRINK & MAUREEN DIMINO, NAT’L
ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE
TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 14–17 (2009),
http://www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=20808.
47. See SMITH & MADDEN, supra note 21, at 15 (discussing how “for those
without lawyers, information regarding proceedings and defendant’s options
were limited to generic explanations of court protocols generally communicated
en masse”).
48. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 806 (1975) (holding “that a
defendant in a state criminal trial has a constitutional right to proceed without
counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so, and that the state
may not force a lawyer upon him when he insists that he wants to conduct his
own defense”).
49. See id. at 814 (noting that a defendant may “competently and
intelligently waive his constitutional right to counsel”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 464–65 (1938) (“The determination of whether there has been an
intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the
particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the
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In spite of this requirement, there is evidence that courts in
certain jurisdictions are accepting counsel waivers without
sufficiently advising defendants of their right to counsel and
those risks. For instance, a study of misdemeanor cases in Florida
found that 27% of unrepresented defendants were not told that
they had a right to counsel, and over 60% of them were not
informed of the importance of being represented by counsel.50 Site
observations in a number of misdemeanor courts across the
country also demonstrate that judges failed to inform most
defendants of the dangers of self-representation, and many
waivers either were obtained on written forms or as part of
compound or confusing questions.51 As a result, it appears that
many unrepresented misdemeanor defendants either may not
know that they have a right to court-appointed counsel or may
not receive sufficient information to validly waive the right to
counsel.
There are also practical barriers to invoking the right to
counsel, even if the right is fully understood. In many
jurisdictions, defendants must pay a fee in order to be
represented by court-appointed counsel.52 Indeed, in some states,
defendants must pay a fee before they can apply for courtappointed representation.53 Because states may not deny counsel
simply because a defendant lacks the resources to pay a fee, most
of the statutes specify that defendants are not responsible for
paying the fee if they cannot afford it.54 But it is not clear that all
background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”).
50. See SMITH & MADDEN, supra note 21, at 22 tbl.6.
51. See BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 46, at 15–16 (noting that one judge
told a defendant “I want you to waive your right to an attorney,” because the
judge refused to appoint a public defender and did not think the defendant
would hire an attorney).
52. Approximately 80% of county-based or local public defender offices
require the payment of some sort of fee. See DONALD J. FAROLE, JR. & LYNNE
LANGTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: COUNTY-BASED AND
LOCAL PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007 at 6 (2010), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/pub/pdf/clpdo07.pdf.
53. Approximately 44% of the offices that require the payment of fees use
up-front application or administrative fees. Id.; see also, e.g., GA. CODE ANN.
§ 15-21A-6(c) (2012) (requiring that a $50 application fee must be submitted
before application for counsel will be evaluated).
54. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 15-21A-6(c) (“The court shall waive the fee if
it finds that the applicant is unable to pay the fee or that measurable hardship
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jurisdictions actually inform defendants that the fee can be
waived.55 This form of failed notice raises obvious constitutional
difficulties. After all, a defendant who believes he must pay for
counsel even if he cannot afford it is not receiving the right to
appointment of counsel guaranteed by the Constitution.
There is a further obstacle to invoking the right to counsel. In
some jurisdictions, defendants are told that if they request
counsel, their case will be delayed.56 Particularly for
misdemeanor defendants who have been denied bail and who
receive a time-served plea offer that will get them out of jail as
soon as they plead guilty, any delay results in additional time in
jail. Under those circumstances, defendants (even those who are
innocent) have every incentive to waive counsel in order to plead
guilty and resolve the case as quickly as possible. Suffice it to say,
then, significant (and perhaps unconstitutional) pressure is
exerted to obtain waivers of the right to counsel from
misdemeanor defendants.
B. Systemic Factors Leading to Underrepresentation
The obstacles described above almost certainly contribute to
misdemeanor defendants’ lower rates of representation. But they
leave the underlying question of why jurisdictions with virtually
100% felony representation have neither striven for nor achieved
similar misdemeanor representation rates. In other words, why
have special barriers arisen to representation in misdemeanor,
but not in felony cases? The answer to that question, I think, has
much to do with systemic forces.
At the time the Court decided Gideon, forty-four states
already provided representation to all indigent felony defendants,
and only five states limited such representation to capital cases.57
will result if the fee is charged.”).
55. See BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 46, at 20 (noting that many
defendants who are unaware the fee can be waived do not seek court-appointed
counsel and proceed pro se).
56. Id. at 18–19.
57. See John F. Decker & Thomas J. Lorigan, Comment, Right to Counsel:
The Impact of Gideon v. Wainwright in the Fifty States, 3 CREIGHTON L. REV.
103, 104 & n.13 (1970).
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As a result, Gideon’s guarantee of a right to counsel affected only
the five states that had not been providing counsel to all felony
defendants. Also of importance, counsel in those jurisdictions had
a financial incentive to ensure that the state respected the right
to counsel. At the time, very few jurisdictions had public defender
systems,58 and private lawyers were appointed as a matter of
judicial discretion to represent criminal defendants.59 Of course,
some states or counties paid appointed counsel very little (if
anything), but for the most part, appointed counsel were paid for
their work.60 Thus, in most jurisdictions counsel had at least
some incentive to ensure that indigent defendants received the
representation to which they were constitutionally entitled.
The enforcement of the right to counsel for misdemeanor
defendants guaranteed by Argersinger and Shelton presented
more difficult issues. First, Argersinger, and perhaps to an even
greater extent Shelton, increased the number of defendants
entitled to appointment in many more states than Gideon. PostGideon, nineteen states did not provide counsel to any
misdemeanor defendants, and twelve additional states appointed
counsel only for defendants charged with serious misdemeanors.61
Similarly, pre-Shelton, sixteen states did not provide counsel to
defendants in Shelton’s circumstances (i.e., sentenced to a
“substantial fine” and a suspended term of incarceration under a
statute authorizing imprisonment of up to one year), and ten
58. See George Yuhas, Note, Statewide Public Defender Organizations: An
Appealing Alternative, 29 STAN. L. REV. 157, 157 n.3 (1976) (“The year Gideon
and Douglas were decided only 18 states had legislation authorizing the
establishment of local defender offices, and only 5 states had any sort of
statewide public defender system.”).
59. See Nancy A. Goldberg, Defender Systems of the Future: The New
National Standards, 12 AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 709, 713 (1975) (noting that at the
time Gideon was decided, indigent defense “was a matter of judicial discretion
and charitable contribution by bar associations rather than a ‘system’”).
60. See Richard L. Grier, Comment, Analysis and Comparison of the
Assigned Counsel and Public Defender Systems, 49 N.C. L. REV. 705, 707–08
(1971) (reporting that assigned counsel has been less expensive because
attorneys have been paid only a fraction of the value their services would
otherwise bring, but noting that even when state statutes did not provide for
payment of assigned counsel, courts still required at least some payment).
61. See Decker & Lorigan, supra note 57, at 119–24 (discussing the various
methods these twelve states used to determine if a misdemeanor was serious
enough to warrant appointed counsel).
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other states did not provide counsel to all defendants covered by
the Court’s holding.62 Thus, Argersinger and Shelton required a
far more significant expansion in the appointment of counsel than
did Gideon. Second, the vast majority of cases prosecuted in state
courts across the country are misdemeanor offenses, and a
significant percentage of defendants convicted in misdemeanor
cases are likely sentenced either to incarceration or to
probation.63 As a result, the holdings in Argersinger and Shelton
likely covered more cases than were affected by the Court’s
holding in Gideon.
In addition, lawyers have had significantly less incentive to
ensure the enforcement of Shelton than Gideon. By the time the
Court decided Shelton, most criminal defendants were arrested in
jurisdictions that had established public defender systems.64
States had good reasons for establishing these offices, both
because significant questions regarding the quality of
representation provided by contract (and some other appointed)
counsel had been raised65 and because there was evidence that
public defender offices handle cases more efficiently and
economically
than
other
methods
of
court-appointed
representation.66 But for misdemeanor defendants, the public
62. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 679 n.4 (2002) (Scalia, J.
dissenting) (listing the states, in addition to the sixteen identified by the
majority in its decision, whose laws would be altered as a result of the majority’s
decision).
63. As discussed above, North Carolina sentences approximately 55% of its
misdemeanor defendants to probation and 24% to incarceration, but Florida
appears to sentence misdemeanants to probation at a much lower rate. See
supra Part II. Data on incarceration and probation rates of misdemeanants
across the states are simply lacking in most states.
64. See HARLOW, supra note 13, at 4 (noting that in 1999, two-thirds of
state prosecutors “reported that their courts used public defenders”).
65. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
CONTRACTING FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES: A SPECIAL REPORT 13–15 (2000),
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/181160.pdf (detailing the caseload problems
that can arise in contract systems); Paul Calvin Drecksel, The Crisis in Indigent
Criminal Defense, 44 ARK. L. REV. 363, 381–82 (1991) (noting the trend toward
the use of contract systems and observing that these systems fail to provide
effective assistance); Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, Low-Bid Criminal
Defense Contracting: Justice in Retreat, 21 CHAMPION 22, 22–24 (1997)
(lamenting the rise of low-bid contracting for indigent defense services).
66. See, e.g., Pauline Houlden & Steven Balkin, Quality and Cost
Comparisons of Private Bar Indigent Systems: Contract vs. Ordered Assigned
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defender system model creates a serious problem. The problem is
that lawyers in these offices, already swamped with excessive
caseloads, have little incentive to take on more clients. Indeed,
public defenders facing ever-mounting caseloads arguably have
an ethical obligation to their existing clients to prevent additional
cases from being assigned to them.67 As a result, public defenders
have very little incentive to ensure that the state respects
misdemeanor defendants’ constitutional right to counsel. Thus, in
striking contrast to the situation with respect to virtually every
other constitutional right guaranteed to criminal defendants that
have lawyers, public defenders may have powerful incentives not
to seek the additional work that would result from protecting the
right to counsel.
Another problem arises from excessive public defender or
assigned counsel caseloads. Such caseloads may discourage
misdemeanor defendants from seeking representation by those
lawyers. As others have documented, publicly appointed lawyers
often labor under overwhelming caseloads that force them to
limit representation to the most minimal level.68 After all, a
lawyer expected to represent, in some documented instances,
thousands of clients per year can do nothing beyond telling the
client to plead guilty and then standing by as the client does so.69
Given the reality that lawyers with these caseloads may not be
Counsel, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 176, 180 (1985).
67. See Heidi Reamer Anderson, Funding Gideon’s Promise by Viewing
Excessive Caseloads as Unethical Conflicts of Interest, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
421, 421–22 (2012) (describing state underfunding as creating for public
defenders a “current client conflict, in which the number of other criminal
defendant clients currently assigned to him ‘materially limits’ his ability to
represent any one of his clients”).
68. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT
DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR
EQUAL JUSTICE 17–18 (2004), http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/
defender/brokenpromise/fullreport.pdf (detailing caseloads of public defenders
across the country); Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in
Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1054–57 (2006)
(describing the crushing caseloads of public defenders).
69. See Backus & Marcus, supra note 68, at 1082 (reporting that two parttime contract attorneys in Indiana were assigned a total of 2668 misdemeanor
cases in one year); Robert L. Spangenberg & Tessa J. Schwartz, The Indigent
Defense Crisis is Chronic, 9 CRIM. JUST. 13, 15 (1994) (noting the reality that
“overburdened public defenders are often forced to pick and choose which cases
to focus on, resulting in the inadequate handling of a large number of cases”).
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able to significantly alter the outcome for clients, it perhaps is not
surprising that misdemeanor defendants waive that right.
Finally, judges in at least some jurisdictions either are
unaware of or disagree with Shelton and therefore do not enforce
it. As discussed above, the Chief Justice of the South Carolina
Supreme Court admitted that South Carolina did not comply
with Shelton.70 In the face of such flagrant disregard for the
Court’s holding in Shelton by a person sworn to enforce
constitutional rights, it perhaps is not surprising that trial judges
do not feel compelled to ensure protection of this right.
To be sure, it is possible that some misdemeanor defendants
do not insist on appointment of counsel either because they
affirmatively want to represent themselves or because they
believe that the case is not sufficiently important to bother with
representation. And if misdemeanor defendants make that
decision knowingly and voluntarily, they have a constitutional
right to represent themselves.71 Two facts, however, suggest that
unrepresented misdemeanor defendants have not freely chosen
self-representation. First, observations of misdemeanor courts
demonstrate that many defendants either are not told of their
right to counsel or have the right explained only in boilerplate
writing.72 Second, the felony representation statistics undermine
any argument that a significant percentage of defendants offered
counsel choose self-representation.73 In sum, the combination of
the factors discussed above seems to have led to significant
violations of the right to misdemeanor representation.

70. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
71. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 815–16 (1975) (“The United States
Court[s] of Appeal[] have repeatedly held that the right of self-representation is
protected by the Bill of Rights.”).
72. See SMITH & MADDEN, supra note 21, at 15 (“In some counties,
defendants (15.9%) were advised of their rights when they were handed a
written form by the bailiff as they walked into court. The forms, which are
written in the negative, presume defendants will waive their right to counsel
and enter pleas of guilty or no contest.”).
73. See Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An
Empirical Look at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423, 442 (2007)
(noting that among defendants in the Federal Docketing Database who reported
type of counsel, “less than 0.5% of the defendants reported as selfrepresenting”).
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IV. Fixing Misdemeanor Representation
So what should we do? From all appearances, the
constitutional guarantee of the right to counsel in
misdemeanor cases has come to mean very little in some
jurisdictions, violated both blatantly and covertly without
any repercussions. Indeed, the system has encouraged states
to find ways around the constitutional requirement that they
appoint counsel, and many states have responded by simply
failing to afford representation, developing coercive
processes that result in waivers of counsel, or requiring
misdemeanor public defenders to undertake representation
of so many clients that they cannot possibly represent any,
let alone all, of those clients effectively. 74 In my view, these
practices are both deeply problematic and largely
preventable.
A. Defending the Shelton–Argersinger Line
Before turning to the issue of prevention, a more
fundamental question needs to be addressed. Even if many
jurisdictions are not providing counsel for misdemeanor
defendants or are creating significant barriers to assertion of
the constitutional right, if those defendants are indifferent,
is there any cause for concern? To put it another way, even
assuming that some jurisdictions violate the constitutional
right to counsel set forth in Argersinger and Shelton, should
we care? The answer, I think, is “yes” for several reasons.
First, Argersinger and Shelton, like Gideon, are decisions
of the United States Supreme Court defining the basic scope
of the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution.
Permitting states to blatantly flout their most fundamental
constitutional obligations to criminal defendants 75 provides a
dangerous precedent. To be sure, states and their citizens
often disagree with constitutional decisions of the Supreme
74. See supra Part III.
75. See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 419–21 (2007) (identifying
Gideon’s guarantee of a right to counsel as perhaps the only “watershed” rule of
criminal procedure).
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Court. 76 But any workable commitment to the rule of law
requires states (and others) to nonetheless follow those
decisions. 77 The Supreme Court itself has recognized this
principle in no uncertain terms—and rightly so, given the
text of the Supremacy Clause and foundational commitments
to both general stability and equal justice under law. 78
The rule-of-law principles apply with particular force
when the Court sets forth a clear, bright-line precipice—as
in Gideon, Argersinger, and Shelton—rather than a more
malleable standard, as in the cases setting forth the
standard for the effective assistance of counsel. 79 The right
to counsel, moreover, serves as the constitutional
underpinning for criminal cases because it provides the
primary mechanism for protecting all of defendants’ other
constitutional criminal procedure rights. Indeed, one of the
primary difficulties with enforcing the misdemeanor right to
counsel may be that lawyers are not available to protect the
defendants’ rights. Permitting jurisdictions to opt out of
providing the constitutionally required gateway to all other
constitutional rights undermines both the perception and
provision of fairness in criminal proceedings.
Finally, the line drawn in Argersinger, Scott, and
Shelton, although not perfect, is defensible. Of course, there
are those who argue that the line should be
moved either to include more defendants 80 or to include
76. The resistance of school districts in the segregated south to Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), is perhaps the most oft-cited example
of this. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil
Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 111–12 (1994).
77. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Rule of Law as a Concept of
Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (1997) (listing the five elements
that generally constitute the Rule of Law).
78. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1958) (“No state legislator
or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without
violating his undertaking to support it.”).
79. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (“When a
convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel’s assistance, the
defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness.”).
80. The National Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys has taken the
position that any defendant charged with a criminal offense should have a
constitutional right to counsel because of the enormous consequences of
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fewer. 81 To the extent that the line has not been correctly
drawn, perhaps it makes most sense to spend resources getting
the line moved rather than on enforcing the right that currently
exists. In fact, that line has been defensibly drawn both because
(1) it gives states distinct options for complying with the
constitutional requirement, and (2) it permits jurisdictions to
focus on ways of providing, rather than seeking ways to deny,
representation.
To be sure, criminal convictions, including misdemeanor
convictions, can have significant life-altering consequences for the
defendant regardless of the sentence imposed as a result of the
conviction.82 For instance, a misdemeanor conviction can lead to
deportation, denial of housing and other benefits, and loss of
employment opportunities.83 Each of these losses affects the
defendant at least as much—and arguably far more—than a
probationary or even a short incarceration sentence. And some
therefore have argued that all criminal defendants should have a
right to appointed counsel.84 It is unrealistic, however, to imagine
such an outcome in light of resulting costs and budgetary
constraints. Perhaps more to the point, guaranteeing a right to
counsel apparently has not ensured that Shelton and Argersinger
conviction, including deportation, loss of benefits, and lost employment
opportunities. See BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 46, at 17–18 (making
recommendations in light of a report noting an absence of counsel for
misdemeanor cases); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining
Effective Advocacy in the Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 333
(2011).
81. Cf. Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging AppointedCounsel Funding and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 967–94
(2012) (“In rejecting a broad new constitutional right, the Court steered toward
more sustainable reform for pro se litigants. The Court’s solution is far more
realistic than a grandiose new right to counsel.”).
82. See Roberts, supra note 80, at 277 (“Yet the consequences of even the
most ‘minor’ misdemeanor conviction can be far reaching, and include
deportation, sex offender registration, and loss of public housing and student
loans.”).
83. See id. (listing the various negative, “collateral consequences” of a
misdemeanor conviction).
84. Rinat Kitai, What Remains Necessary Following Alabama v. Shelton to
Fulfill the Right of a Criminal Defendant to Counsel at the Expense of the State?,
30 OHIO N.U. L. REV 35 (2004) (arguing that all criminal defendants should have
access to appointed counsel if they so request, without any limitations or
conditions).

1042

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1019 (2013)

defendants are represented. Requiring appointment of counsel in
more cases would likely only further undermine the rights
already guaranteed. And so, enforcing the existing constitutional
right—ensuring that states respect that right either through
litigation or persuasion—takes on central importance.
If the goal is to ensure representation for those
constitutionally entitled, moreover, the Shelton line offers a
significant advantage over a guarantee to all defendants charged
with a criminal offense. Shelton, dependent as it is on the
defendant’s sentence, offers states a low-cost way to comply with
the Constitution: eliminate incarceration and probated sentences
for low-level offenders.85 The key point is that the current system
gives states a clear alternative if they deem the cost of appointing
counsel too high: change the penalty structure. That alternative,
infinitely preferable to coercing waiver of the right to counsel,
provides states with a low-cost way to comply with the
Constitution without skirting its commands.
That leaves only the question of whether the benefits lawyers
provide to misdemeanor defendants adequately offset the costs of
those lawyers? After all, if lawyers do not benefit misdemeanor
clients, then states perhaps legitimately should be seeking to
avoid the strictures of Argersinger and Shelton by seeking
waivers. That question proves more difficult to answer than one
might expect, in part because we lack data on the effect of counsel
on misdemeanor cases.86 Even if we had such data, moreover, it
would measure only the effectiveness of lawyers in an admittedly
flawed system in which many lawyers carry overwhelming
caseloads that undermine effectiveness.87

85. See Hashimoto, supra note 23, at 499–502.
86. I previously reported skepticism regarding the effectiveness of counsel
in misdemeanor cases, based in part on an assessment of the outcomes of
misdemeanor cases in federal court. See id. at 489. As I discussed in that article,
however, the data were subject to numerous limitations. Id. at 494. In addition,
we completely lack data on outcomes in state courts, where virtually all
misdemeanor cases are prosecuted.
87. See id. at 495 (“The differential in the results of state and federal felony
pro se defendants may not be representative of the results of state and federal
pro se misdemeanor defendants, particularly because the volume of pro se
misdemeanor defendants in state courts is so much greater.”); Roberts, supra
note 80, at 296.
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Perhaps the most compelling argument that counsel can
make a difference in at least some misdemeanor cases is that
there is not a bright line, in terms of complexity of the case,
between felonies and misdemeanors. If representation by counsel
makes a difference in felony cases, it must also be able to make a
difference in at least some misdemeanor cases. As a result,
although I recognize that the Shelton line may be imperfect,
ultimately I think it sufficiently defensible that it should be the
basis for the right-to-counsel battleground.
B. Getting to Compliance
The bottom line is that lawyers and advocacy organizations
need to be working to ensure that states respect the
constitutional right to counsel the Supreme Court has
guaranteed. Finding ways to ensure enforcement, of course, is the
challenge. There are, however, four critical steps that can be
taken to help facilitate compliance: (1) Lawyers and advocacy
groups need to organize around ensuring that states comply with
the current constitutional mandate and remove that obligation
from public defenders; (2) those organizations must continue to
gather data and observe appointment practices to document the
extent to which jurisdictions are (or are not) complying with the
obligation to appoint counsel; (3) judges need to be educated
about the constitutional right at stake and the ways in which
constitutional compliance can be achieved; and (4) lawyers need
to assure that misdemeanor defendants whose rights have been
violated have a mechanism for appeal.
First, private lawyers and advocacy groups must organize
around the failure to appoint counsel to constitutionally entitled
misdemeanor defendants. To the extent that public defenders and
court-appointed counsel have the time and resources to spend on
this effort, their participation would be helpful. But they should
not be expected to take the lead on this issue, both because
lawyers in those offices (and particularly misdemeanor public
defenders) often have completely unmanageable workloads88 and
because putting them in the position of advocating for taking on
88.

See Hashimoto, supra note 23, at 470–73.
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more cases risks creating ethical conflicts for them.89 Indeed, to
the extent those lawyers have more clients than they can
effectively represent, advocating for representing additional
potential clients may result in an ethical violation.90 As a result,
the private bar and advocacy organizations must bear the burden
of ensuring that states respect misdemeanor defendants’ right to
counsel.91
Second, collecting more data—both statistical and
anecdotal—on misdemeanor representation is critical. This
process has to begin with seeking a better understanding of the
extent to which jurisdictions currently provide counsel to
misdemeanor defendants. We need better data regarding whether
jurisdictions appoint counsel to misdemeanor defendants who
have a right to counsel. That will require data both on the extent
to which misdemeanor defendants are represented (and by whom)
and on misdemeanor sentencing. Data collections like North
Carolina’s may be far from perfect, but at the very least, they
provide enough information that we can begin to understand the
extent to which misdemeanor defendants are (or are not) being
represented.92 Unfortunately, North Carolina’s data collection is
the outlier rather than the norm.
There is, however, a problem with efforts to collect data:
jurisdictions that are failing to appoint counsel to constitutionally
89. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441
(2006)
All lawyers, including public defenders and other lawyers who, under
court appointment or government contract, represent indigent
persons charged with criminal offenses, must provide competent and
diligent representation. If workload prevents a lawyer from providing
competent and diligent representation to existing clients, she must
not accept new clients. If the clients are being assigned through a
court appointment system, the lawyer should request that the court
not make any new appointments.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Rocky Robinson, President’s Message, Be Proud—Give Back,
HOUS. LAW., July/Aug. 2004, at 6, available at http://www.thehouston
lawyer.com/aa_july04/presi.htm (discussing the role of the Houston Bar
Association in enforcing the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of
Education).
92. Of course, even if those data are collected, we still will be missing data
on the indigence levels of misdemeanor defendants, but at least for present
purposes, data on representation and sentencing at least would provide a much
clearer picture of constitutional compliance rates.
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entitled misdemeanor defendants have no incentive to collect
data establishing that fact. Those jurisdictions will not keep such
data unless they have some incentive to do so, either a reward for
collecting it or a sanction for not doing so. There are a number of
ways that the BJS could provide jurisdictions with an incentive to
collect this data. It could, for instance, provide grants to
jurisdictions that collect this data. The Department of Justice
could also withhold certain types of funding from jurisdictions
that refuse to collect and provide misdemeanor data to BJS.
Indeed, that essentially is how BJS has collected data on felony
defendants in large counties. In addition, private organizations or
lawyers need to exert pressure on jurisdictions to collect data by
threatening to bring lawsuits to obtain these data from various
state actors. Notably, some states do collect data on misdemeanor
prosecutions but then refuse to disclose that data. If nothing else,
the Bar and advocacy groups should press to change this practice.
Without data on representation rates and sentencing of
misdemeanor defendants, we simply do not know the extent to
which counsel are, or are not, being appointed to represent
defendants.
This data, if collected in a systematic way, would be
important both to ascertain the practices that states use to
achieve constitutional compliance and to identify the jurisdictions
that are not complying. As to the first point, data would shed
light on the states that actually are providing counsel to
constitutionally entitled misdemeanor defendants. This would
allow examination of the practices in those jurisdictions that have
led to constitutional compliance, including the ways those
jurisdictions have made representation economically feasible. For
instance, it would allow examination of sentencing practices to
determine whether the misdemeanor courts comply by increasing
the use of fines as a sentence, or by simply appointing lawyers in
significantly more misdemeanor cases, or by reducing the overall
number of misdemeanor cases being prosecuted.93 This
93. There is significant variation among the states regarding the
proportion of misdemeanor to felony cases prosecuted. See R. LaFountain, R.
Schauffler, S. Strickland, S. Gibson & A. Mason, Examining the Work of States
Courts: An Analysis of 2009 State Court Caseloads 23 (National Center for State
Courts 2011), http://www.courtstatistics.org/FlashMicrosites/CSP/images/CSP
2009.pdf.
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information could, in turn, provide other states that have
encountered greater problems with compliance with a roadmap
for adjusting the way in which they handle their own
misdemeanor cases.
Data also would identify the jurisdictions that are not
appointing counsel. If, as expected, data and observations
demonstrate that some jurisdictions either are not providing
representation to significant percentages of misdemeanor
defendants who have a constitutional right to representation or
have coercive waiver policies in place, private lawyers and
organizations must make it a priority to educate judges and the
public about this pattern of wrongdoing. In some instances,
violations of the misdemeanor right to counsel may be the result
of a deliberate decision of a court to shirk constitutional
responsibility.94 In many other cases, however, judges may not
fully understand the extent to which misdemeanor defendants
have a constitutional right to counsel.
In addition, counsel need to work with state judges regarding
alternatives for complying with the constitutional rule. Judges
need to know that they can either provide counsel or eliminate
imprisonment and probation penalties in misdemeanor cases.95
Providing judges with a constitutional alternative to the
appointment of counsel—sentencing defendants to fines rather
than probation or imprisonment—responds to the worries of
judges who believe that they do not have the resources to appoint
counsel in all misdemeanor cases.96 Perhaps most importantly,
such education may foster respect for the right to counsel in
keeping with the Supreme Court’s teaching.
Of course, educating legislators and judges will not solve all
problems. As a result, private attorneys and organizations must
commit to appealing unconstitutional convictions obtained
without representation or to challenging in court the practices of
94. Consider the statement by the Chief Justice of the South Carolina
Supreme Court. See Frederick, supra note 15 and accompanying text.
95. See Hashimoto, supra note 23, at 513.
96. Robert Boruchowitz has implemented just such a project to educate
judges and legislators in the state of Washington. See The Defender Initiative:
Initiative’s Projects and Activities, SEATTLE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW,
http://law.seattleu.edu/x10378.xml (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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judges who either refuse to appoint counsel or coerce defendants
into waiving the right to counsel. In addition to litigating these
cases, counsel can provide information to defendants on
appealing their sentences, including by producing draft form
briefs that pro se defendants can use. Particularly for Argersinger
defendants sentenced to imprisonment, draft briefs challenging
the constitutionality of a conviction circulating at the jail can be
very helpful to pro se appellants. But educating judges about
Sixth Amendment compliance and increasing the cost of failing to
comply offer a promising avenue to achieving much-enhanced
compliance with the misdemeanor right to counsel.
V. Conclusion
The right to counsel guaranteed by Shelton and Argersinger
is as fundamental and important as that guaranteed by Gideon.
That
fact
notwithstanding,
significant
numbers
of
constitutionally entitled misdemeanor defendants remain
unrepresented either because the jurisdiction completely ignores
the constitutional obligation to provide counsel, or because it
erects unconstitutionally high barriers to the appointment of
counsel. Private lawyers need to give highest priority to assuring
representation for those constitutionally entitled to it by
documenting misdemeanor appointment practices and by
ensuring that consequences attach to unconstitutional practices.
Until all jurisdictions respect the basic constitutional right to
counsel guaranteed to misdemeanor defendants, Gideon’s
promise will remain unfulfilled.

